

Term Information

Effective Term Summer 2012

General Information

Course Bulletin Listing/Subject Area Economics
Fiscal Unit/Academic Org Economics - D0722
College/Academic Group Social And Behavioral Sciences
Level/Career Graduate
Course Number/Catalog 8891.03
Course Title Colloquium in Economic Theory
Transcript Abbreviation Theory Colloquium
Course Description A supervised workshop in which advanced graduate students report their latest research in progress on the themes chosen by the colloquium instructor in advanced theory and related fields.
Semester Credit Hours/Units Variable: Min 1 Max 3

Offering Information

Length Of Course 14 Week, 7 Week, 4 Week (May Session), 12 Week (May + Summer)
Flexibly Scheduled Course Never
Does any section of this course have a distance education component? No
Grading Basis Letter Grade
Repeatable Yes
Allow Multiple Enrollments in Term No
Max Credit Hours/Units Allowed 16
Max Completions Allowed 8
Course Components Workshop
Grade Roster Component Workshop
Credit Available by Exam No
Admission Condition Course No
Off Campus Never
Campus of Offering Columbus

Prerequisites and Exclusions

Prerequisites/Corequisites Permission of instructor and economics director of graduate studies; open to students who have completed PhD field courses approved by economics director of graduate studies; repeatable 7 times to a maximum of 16 credit hours

Exclusions

Cross-Listings

Cross-Listings

Subject/CIP Code

Subject/CIP Code 45.0601
Subsidy Level Doctoral Course
Intended Rank Doctoral

Quarters to Semesters

Quarters to Semesters

New course

Give a rationale statement explaining the purpose of the new course

Group independent study-cum-workshop in which research in progress can be presented, critiqued and discussed in the field of advanced economic theory and related areas.

Sought concurrence from the following Fiscal Units or College

Requirement/Elective Designation

The course is an elective (for this or other units) or is a service course for other units

Course Details

Course goals or learning objectives/outcomes

Content Topic List

- Original research or innovations in advanced economic theory and related fields. Research themes and contents vary according to enrolled students' research need and colloquium instructor's research interest.

Attachments

- E8891.03 Colloquim\$Theory@DGS.pdf: Course Syllabus

(Syllabus. Owner: Miyazaki,Hajime)

Comments

Workflow Information

Status	User(s)	Date/Time	Step
Submitted	Miyazaki,Hajime	03/14/2012 06:00 PM	Submitted for Approval
Approved	Miyazaki,Hajime	03/14/2012 06:12 PM	Unit Approval
Approved	Haddad,Deborah Moore	03/15/2012 12:12 PM	College Approval
Pending Approval	Nolen,Dawn Jenkins,Mary Ellen Bigler Meyers,Catherine Anne Vankeerbergen,Bernadete Chantal Hogle,Danielle Nicole Hanlin,Deborah Kay	03/15/2012 12:12 PM	ASCCAO Approval

ECONOMICS 8891.03: COLLOQUIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY

COURSE OBJECTIVE: A supervised workshop in which advanced graduate students report their latest research on the theme chosen by the instructor in advanced theory and related fields. The workshop provides a forum in which research *in progress* can be discussed in depth, to enable hands-on guidance on research directions, presentations and publication quality writing, in the group workshop setting. The colloquium instructor selects a research theme, on which a series of speakers, mostly advanced graduate students and occasionally faculty members, gives presentations on their advanced economic theory research in progress. The colloquium instructor may occasionally provide supplement lectures to advance the participants' research in progress.

PREREQUISITES: Permission of instructor and economics director of graduate studies. Open to students who passed Ph.D. qualifier exams in both micro and macroeconomics and fulfilled two Ph.D. field requirements. Colloquium instructor may impose additional prerequisites. Letter grade only.

CREDIT HOURS: This colloquium course is repeatable to a maximum of 16 credit hours and of 8 completions, and may be offered every term. The course credit hours are variable so that a post candidacy graduate student may take it for one credit hour.

Credit Hours: 01 – 03 Variable
Course Listing: G
Grade: Letter grade
Repeatability: Maximum 16 credit hours and Maximum 8 completions

COURSE REQUIREMENTS: The course meets twice per week. Students are required to submit a term research paper, present their work at least once, write critiques of each work presented, and participate actively in each class meeting. The exact weight of these requirements will be determined by a colloquium instructor.

Autumn Semester 2012

Colloquium Theme: Matching Models and Mechanism Design

Colloquium Instructors: Professors Paul J. Healy and Yaron Azrieli
Department of Economics
465 Arps Hall, 1945 N. High Street
Phone: 247-8876 Email: healy.52@osu.edu and azrieli.2@osu.edu
Office Hours (TBA)

Course Overview: This course covers select research topics in the evolving frontiers of mechanism design in economic theory, focusing on matching models and their implementation.

Prerequisites: a successful completion of micro and macro qualifiers, a successful completion of two Ph.D. field requirements, and permission of colloquium instructor and economics director of graduate studies.

Course Grading: Students will receive a letter grade based on the following criteria: 30% for participation, 30% for presentation, and 40% for the resulting research paper

COURSE SCHEDULE OUTLINE:

Week 1. Overview of matching models by Profs. Healy and Azrieli. See Roth & Sotomayor 1992.

Week 2 (Student Presentation TBA) The marriage model with no side payments: theory.

Week 3 (Student Presentation TBA) The marriage model with no side payments: experiments.

Week 4 (Student Presentation TBA) The marriage model with side payments: theory.

Week 5 (Student Presentation TBA) The marriage model with side payments: applications.

Week 6 (Student Presentation TBA) The marriage model with side payments: experiments.

Week 7 (Student Presentation TBA) Many-to-one matchings: theory.

Week 8 (Student Presentation TBA) Many-to-one matchings: applications.

Week 9 (Student Presentation TBA) Many-to-one matchings: experiments.

Week 10 (Student Presentation TBA) Many-to-many matchings: theory

Week 11 (Student Presentation TBA) Many-to-many matchings: applications

Week 12 (Student Presentation TBA) Many-to-many matchings: experiments.

Week 13: (Student Presentation TBA) Strategic considerations: theory

Week 14: (Student Presentation TBA) Strategic considerations: experiments.

GENERAL READING LIST:

Surveys

• Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M., 1992. Two-sided matching. In: Aumann, R., Hart, S. (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications. Vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam, Ch. 16, pp. 485–541

Marriage model with no side payments:

• Gale, D., Shapley, L., 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1), 9–15

• Roth, A., Vande Vate, J., 1990. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58 (6), 1475–1480

- Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2004. Random matching under dichotomous preferences. *Econometrica* 72, 257–279
- Echenique, F., 2008. What matchings can be stable ? the testable implications of matching theory 33 (3), 757–768

Marriage model with side payments:

- Shapley, L., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game I: The core. *International Journal of Game Theory* 1, 111–130
- Mo, J. P., 1988. Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games. *Journal of Economic Theory* 46, 66–96
- Vande Vate, J., 1989. Linear programming brings marital bliss. *Operations Research Letters* 8, 147–153
- Chambers, C., Echenique, F., 2009. Core matchings of markets with transfers, Caltech SS Working Paper 1298

Many-to-one matchings:

- Crawford, V., Kelso, A., 1982. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. *Econometrica* 50, 1483–1504
- Roth, A., 1984b. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching. *Econometrica* 52, 47–57
- Roth, A., 1985. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. *Journal of Economic Theory* 36, 277–288
- Roth, A., Sotomayor, M., 1989. The college admissions problem revisited. *Econometrica* 57, 559–570
- Crawford, V., 1991. Comparative statics in matching markets. *Journal of Economic Theory* 54, 389–400
- Abdulkadiroglu, A., Sonmez, T., 2003. School choice: A mechanism design approach. *American Economic Review* 93, 729–747
- Echenique, F., Oviedo, J., 2004. Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. *Journal of Economic Theory* 115 (2), 358–376
- Echenique, F., Yenmez, M. B., 2007. A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues. *Games and Economic Behavior* 59 (1), 46–71

Many-to-many matchings:

- Echenique, F., Oviedo, J., 2006. A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. *Theoretical Economics* 1 (2), 233–273

Strategic considerations:

- Roth, A., 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives 7, 617–628

- Leonard, H., 1983. Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions. *Journal of Political Economy* 91, 461–479
- Roth, A., 1984a. Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem. *Journal of Economic Theory* 34, 383–387
- Roth, A., 1989. Two sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences. *Games and Economic Behavior* 1, 191–209
- Kara, T., Sonmez, T., 1996. Nash implementation of matching rules. *Journal of Economic Theory* 68, 425–439

Experiments:

- Chen, Y., Sonmez, T., 2002. Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental study. *American Economic Review* 92, 1669–1686
- Chen, Y., Sonmez, T., 2006. School choice: An experimental study. *Journal of Economic Theory* 127, 202–231
- Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., 2008. Making markets thick: Designing rules for offers and acceptances, Stanford University working paper
- Niederle, M., Yariv, L., 2008. Matching through decentralized markets, working paper
- Echenique, F., Wilson, A., Yariv, L., 2009. Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study, Caltech SS Working Paper 1315
- Niederle, M., Yariv, L., 2009. Decentralized matching with aligned preferences, NBER Working Paper Number 14840
- Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Unver, U., 2010. Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply, Stanford University working paper

Academic Misconduct: It is the responsibility of the Committee on Academic Misconduct to investigate or establish procedures for the investigation of all reported cases of student academic misconduct. The term “academic misconduct” includes all forms of student academic misconduct wherever committed; illustrated by, but not limited to, cases of plagiarism and dishonest practices in connection with examinations. Instructors shall report all instances of alleged academic misconduct to the committee (Faculty Rule 3335-5-487). For additional information, see the Code of Student Conduct (http://studentaffairs.osu.edu/info_for_students/csc.asp).

Any student who needs an accommodation based on the impact of a disability should contact the instructor as soon as possible to discuss ways to meet his or her special needs. Such students should also contact the OSU Office for Disability Services (292-3307).